Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

State Of Utah, By And Through Its Road
Commission v. Jack C. Jensen And Merea W.
Jensen, His Wife, And Intermountain Holding
Company : Brief of Appellants

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Paul N. Cotro-Manes and Joseph P. McCarthy; Attorneys for
Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Jensen, No. 11387 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4425

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Cue No.

vs.
JACK C. JENSEN and MEREA W.
JENSEN~ bis wife, and INTERMOUNTAIN HOLDING COMP ANY,
Defendant8-A'P'fJellanta.

1138'7

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from a Judgment on a Verdi.et, tile
Honorable Leonard Elton PresidiDc

Paul N. Cotro-Manes of
COTRO-MANES, FANKHAUSER & BEASl.B!'

and

JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL
Special Assistant Attorney General

and

TOM G. PLATIS
Assistant Attorney General
286 State Capitol
Salt
Lake City,
Utab..
Attorneys
for Respondent

F I L E D.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Nature of the Case ----------------------------------------------------

1

Disposition of the Case by Lower Court ----------------

2

Relief Sought on Appeal --------------------------------------------

2

Statement of the Facts ------------------------------------------------

2

Argument------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
POINT I. The trial court erred in granting a
motion for new trial based upon the grounds of
excessive damages. -------------------------------------------------------- 7
POINT II. The trial court erred in granting a
motion for new trial based upon the grounds of
passion and prejudice of the jury. -------------------------------- 10
POINT III. The defendants-appellants preserved
their right to appeal from the court's order granting
a new trial. -------------------------------------------------------------------- 19
POINT V. The court erred in not granting
defendants a new trial where jury improperly deliberated. __ . _____________________________ .... __ . ______________________________ . 20
AUTHORITIES CITED
Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 U.2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 ________ 14
Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co., 3 U.2d 444, 286 P.2d 240 ------------------------ 12
Crellin v. Thomas, 122 U. 122, 247 P.2d 264 ________ 14
Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U. 82,

218 P.2d 1080 ------------------------------------------------------ 16
1

Page
Glover v. Berger (Wyom, 1953) 263 P.2d 498 ........ 21
Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17 U.2d 295, 409 P.2d

972 ······························································
20
Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 U.2d 185, 389 P .2d 737 .... 20
Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U.2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 ........ 19
J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17 U.2d 120,
405 P.2d 343 .......................................................... 20
J

!

ens;~o~.l~ei>~e;l~f~ol~r~~~~-~~~~~~~~-~~·-~-~-~--~: .. 18 I

Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 U.2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 ................ 17

!
I

Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 U. 431, 184 P.2d 123 .... 16 I
Ruff v. Association of World T~ravel Exchange,
10 U.2d 249, 351 P.2d 623 ................................ 15
Saltas v. Affleck, 99 U. 381, 105 P.2d 176 ........ 11, 13
Stamp v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 5 U.2d 397,
303 p .2d 279 ........................................................ 15
State v. Christensen, 13 U.2d 224, 371 P.2d 552 .... 13
State, Road Commission v. Taggart, 19 U.2d 247,
430 P.2d 167 ........................................................ 18
Tangaro v ..Marrero, 13 U.2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 .... 16

Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Skeen,
I
et al, 8 U.2d 79, 328 P.2d 739 ........................ 10, 13 l
'Vellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 336 P.2d 701 ........ 11
RULES CITED
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ................ 16
Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ........ -- 19
11

f

IN THE SUPREME COURT
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Defen(fonfg-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter arises out of a condemnation suit
brought by the State of Utah, by and through its Road
Commission, to condemn a right of way belonging to
defendants located in the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, for interstate highway purposes.
1

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY
LOWER COURT
This is an appeal from an order granting respou<lent a new trial following the first trial in this matter,
and from a judgment rendered for appellants and
against respondent in the second trial of the above
matter.

RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the trial court's order
granting to respondent a new trial, and request that
the verdict entered by the jury in the first trial be
reinstated; or in the alternative, that the jury's verdict
in the first trial be reduced to the amount determined
by the first trial court in its remittiture order ma<lc
and entered in the above matter; or further, in the
alternative, granting to appellants a new trial based
upon the second trial court's error in accepting a verdict
from a jury which had improperly deliberated.

STATE.MENT OF FACTS
The State of Utah, by and through its Road Com·
mission, commenced an action to condemn a 20 foot
right-of-way opening to the defendant-appellants' prop·
erty, which right-of-way was located on the northeast
side of Parleys Canyon near its mouth, in Salt Lake
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County, Utah. The property owned by the defendants
to which the right-of-way was appurtenant is commonly known as the Century Placer, a tract of land
originally located and patented under the mining laws
of the United States relating to placer claims, the
original tract of land consisting of 80 acres.
In 1955 the State of Utah negotiated with defendants' predecessor in interest, the American Smelting & Refining Co., and as a result of the negotiations
a written contract was entered into between the parties
whereby the American Smelting & Refining Co. ga\'e
up all of its right of access of Highway U. S. 40, which
adjoined the property in question on the south, and in
consideration the State granted to American Smelting
& Refining Co. a 20 foot right-of-way to Highway
U.S. 40 and agreed to construct an approach to this
20 foot access opening. The location of this right-ofway was designated on the ground by a particular engineer's stake description. The State of Utah paid to
American Smelting & Refining Co. a sum of money
for approximately 7 acres of land transferred from the
Century Placer to it for expansion purposes of Highway U.S. 40, and for the giving up of the right of
ingress and egress to Highway U.S; 40 except through
the 20 foot right-of-way opening, the only existing
access to the entire tract of land. (R-37)
In 1961 the defendants Jack C. Jens en and Merea
W. Jensen acquired the property from a successor in
interest to American Smelting & Refining Co., con-
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sis ting of 73.2 acres. The defendants Jensen subsequently conveyed one-half interest in the property tu
the defendant Intermountain Holding Company, whicli
is a partnership consisting of Mr. Raymond C. Bowen,
his wife and children. (R-150) in 1961 (R-164). ln
1962 .Mr. Jensen requested the State of Utah to con.,
struct the approach road to the 20 foot access opening,
which the State of Utah declined to do on the grounds
that: ( 1) the cost of the construction would be too
expensive in that the access opening was not where the
parties had thought it was, and it was impracticable
to construct the access opening at that point; and (2)
the State of Utah did not wish to enhance the value
of the defendants' property in that it would be neces· .
sary to condemn the access opening when Interstate i
80 came down Parleys Canyon several years hence.
(R-33, 34)
1

On May 18, 1964, the State of Utah commenced
the above action ( R-5) and sought an order of immediate occupancy, the order of immediate occupancy
being granted to the plaintiff on the 25th day of May,
1964. (R-152)
Subsequently the defendants commenced an inde·
pendent action against the State of Utah for breach
of contract for its failure to construct the approach
road to the 20 foot right-of-way access, and this matter
was settled by stipulation of the parties, whereby the
State of Utah paid to the defendants the approximate
sum of $8,000.00. (R-51)
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On the 13th day of September, 1967, the condemnation suit was tried to a court sitting with jury, the
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding. Following
fiYe days of trial, during which time the jury had an
opportunity to visit the subject land, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of the defendants in the sum of
$Hi,251.00 (R-94) and judgment on the verdict was
entered on September 29, 1967 (R-115). The evidence
adduced at the trial in the above matter showed that
the subject property was landlocked by reason of the
State's taking of the 20 foot access opening ( R-51)
there being no other legal right-of-way to defendants'
property. The evidence adduced at the trial showed
the damages to defendants' property by reason of the
taking of the sole access to the property at between
$58,400.00 as the highest figure (R-170), $25,300.00
as the lowest damage figure of defendants' witnesses
(R-328), and $0.0 as the lowest figure ( R-428, 449)
of any witness.Needless to say the $0.0 figure was testified to by the plaintiff's experts, and the other figures
testified to by defendants' experts.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court upon
motion filed by plaintiff's counsel entered a conditional
order of remittiture specifying that if defendants would
accept the sum of $12,001.00 in lieu of the $16,251.00
found by the jury, the court would not enter an order
of new trial, the court basing its order upon excessive
rlamages and bias and prejudice as alleged by plaintiff's counsel. (R-124, 125; R-130)
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The defendants accepted the remittiture and agreer!
to take the $12,001.00 provided that the plaintiff would
not appeal the case. (R-142) The defendants based
their qualified acceptance of the remittiture on the basis
that they did not want to be in a position of accepting
a remittiture to $12,001.00 and then have the State
appeal the case, and if the jury verdict was sustained
then claim that the defendants would only be entitled
to the amount of the remittiture, thereby having nothing
to lose on appeal and everything to gain.
In spite of the defendants' willingness to accept •
the remittiture, the court entered an order granting a
new trial to the plaintiff. (R-130)
The defendants filed a petition for intermediate
appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah in this matter,
but the court declined to accept the appeal (Case No.
11123, Supreme Court of Utah).
Upon second trial of this matter, a jury verdict was
rendered in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff for $3,000.00 (R-132, 133) At the time that
the jury was polled by the defendants, one juror stated
that he had not reached a decision as he had not been
afforded ample time for deliberation. One other juror
disagreed with the majority of six, and the remaining '
six were unanimous that $3,000.00 was the amount
of damages suffered by the defendants from the taking
of the only right-of-way to defendants' land by the
State. Subsequently, a notice of appeal was filed by
defendants. (R-138)
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED
UPON THE GROUNDS OF EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.
The court entered an order on the 14th day of
November, 1967, which stated:
"The verdict of $16,251.00 is excessive and
not justified for want of sufficient evidence and
appears to be given under the influence of passion and prejudice." (R-125)

The record amply substantiates that the damages to
the property taken was between $58,400.00 down to
$0.0.

Mr. Jensen, one of the named defendants who
qualified as an expert in real estate matters, in addition
to being a property owner and therefore qualified to
testify as to the value of his property, testified:
"Q. Do you have an opinion as to what your
land was fairly worth on May 18, 1964, with
access?

A. It would be $1,000.00 an acre, $73,000.00.

Q. Do you have an opinion as to what your

land is worth without access as of May 18,
1964?
A. Maybe $200.00 an acre. It would have to be
purchased by my neighbor. I only have one."
(R-170)
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Mr. Raymond C. Bowers, likewise one of the propert)
owners, qualified as an expert also in real estate, testified:
"Q. You based on your experience, and your
observation over the years in the busines!;
you have been in, do you have an opinio11
as to the value of the acreage-total acre
age, with access, as of May 18, 1964'!
A. I think $1,000.00 an acre figure is a reasonable figure." ( R-242)
'Vhen Mr. llowers was asked what the property wa.1 ,
worth after the taking, he answered:
"Q. Now, as of the same date, May 18, again
1964, do you have an opinion as to the value
of the land assuming you had no access to
the land?
A. Hasn't got much value.
Q. Can you give this to us in dollar amount~
A. I haven't any opinion on it. I think it would
be considerably less than $1,000.00 an acre
with no access." ( R-243)
An independent appraiser, Mr. Sterling 'V ebber, testified as to the value of the land:
"Q. Mr. 'Vebber, I think I asked you to state
the difference in dollars in the two.
A. The difference would be approximately

$25,300.00.
Q. $25,300.00 between then-the difference idf
the property was with access of 20 feet an

without?
A. That is correct."
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.in(1ther witness, Mr. Scott Taggart, was called to tes:!ly, who likewise qualified as an expert and who mmeu
foe adjoining property to the defendants, and vhc 1
asked what the value of the property was replied:
"THE WITNESS: The property that would
be comparable as of that time, my guess is
that it would have been worth in I;fay of
1964 something in the vicinity of $.£00.00 to
$500.00 an acre * * * .

Q. Now this value you place in 1954, assumes
there was access to the property, does it not~
A. That is right.
Q. Now if there were no access to the property
as of that date, would it be worth the same
amount?

MR PLATIS: Objection. No foundation has
been laid.
The Court overruled.
l\IR. lVIcCARTHY: You may answer.
A. It would not be worth the same amount.
You could not get to it.

Q. Would it be worth more or less?
A. Less.
Q. Do you have an op1mon as to how much
worth, with no access?

A. If you could get no access it would be Yirtually worthless."
The court's order in granting plaintiff a new trial
based upon sufficiency of evidence as to the amount
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of damages is not substantiated by the record. It is
submitted that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in granting the motion for new trial. Weber

Basin Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, et al, 8
U.2d 79, 328 P.2d 730.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED
UPON THE GROUNDS OF PASSION AND
PREJUDICE OF THE JURY.
The Court granted its order granting to plaintiff
a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict was
given under "the influence of passion and prejudice".
It is respectfully submitted that the court did not
have grounds to order a new trial as there was no show·
ing of any passion or prejudice whatsoever. The affi·
davit of plaintiff's counsel (R-117, 118) does not set
forth the alleged facts constituting passion and preju·
dice. The plaintiff, through its counsel, does however in
its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict
(R-119 state that the verdict appears to be given under
the influence of passion and prejudice in that the verdict
is excessive, but does not set forth any grounds other
than the excessiveness of verdict to predicate his state·
ment that there was passion and prejudice on behalf
of the jury. As stated above, the record amply supports
a judgment of between $58,400.00 and $0.0. The
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court's order of December 13, 1967, likewise does not
set forth the basis upon which the court granted a new
trial. As set forth in Saltas v. Affleck, 99 U. 381, 105
P.2d 176:

"In order to eliminate speculation as to the
basis of the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting new trials, the record should show the
reasons and make it clear the court is not invading the province of the jury. The trial court
should indicate wherein there was a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of the
court or the evidence or what constituted bias
or prejudice on the part of the jury. If no reasons need be given the province of the jury may
be invaded at will. With no indication as to the
basis for exercise of the power vested in the court
to grant new trials the appeal tribunal would be
left to analyze the matter from the evidence, the
record, and the instructions. It would be required to search out possible reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with the trial court in the exercise of a judicial discretion must be based upon
some facts not withstanding great latitude is
accorded the trial court in such matter." (Citing
cases)
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 336 P.2d 701, stated:
"The appellate court should overrule the trial
court's denial of a new trial involving a jury
verdict only when upon a survey of all the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom and when viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict, the amount of the
award cannot be justified from the evidence on
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any reasonable basis. Of course, if the trial court~
order granting a new trial is expressly made u11
a misconception of the law, we should cormt
such misconception by reversing such an or<ln
granting a new trial."
As shown above, the trial court expressly limited itsell
to the grounds upon which it was granting a new triai.
that is passion and prejudice of the jury and excessi1(·
verdict. This is somewhat analogous to the situatio11
which arose in the case of Bowden v. Denver & Rio
Grande JV cstcrn Railroad Co., 3 U.2d 444, 280 P.2d
240, ·wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that where
the trial court limited its basis for granting a moti011
for a new trial, the Supreme Court would only consider
those bases upon which the trial court predicated ih
motion.
The court in this case stated:
"VVe reaffirm our commitment that 'the right
of jury trial* * * is * * * a right so fundamental
and sacred to the citizen*** (that it) ~il10uld
be jealously guarded by the courts.' " ( Citin~
Authority)
"But once having been granted such right t1!1d
a verdict rendered, it should not be regarded
lightly nor overturned without good and sutficif'nt reason; nor should a judgment be di~1turbe:I
merelv because of an error. Onlv when there 11
error ·both substantial and prejudicial. and whc;
there is a reasonable likelihood that the resul!
would have been different without it, should
error be regarded as sufficient to upset :1 .i mhi·
rnent or grant a new trial."
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The plaintiff did not amplify its motion for new
trial based upon excessive damages or upon passion
and prejudice with any affidavit, as was the case in
State v. Christensen, 13 U.2d 224, 371 P.2d 552, so
that the appellate court now is faced with the problem
of trying to surmise exactly just what passion and prejudice plaintiff was addressing to the court as the basis
for a motion for new trial, and just what exactly the
court based its surmise that there was passion and
prejudice in granting such a motion. Salta.s v. Affleck,
supra. This is a usurpation of the constitutional right
to trial by jury and the right to have the jury fix the
damages in condemnation cases, the usurpation occurring when apparently the trial court felt that $16,251.00
was excessive but that $12,001.00 was not excessive, as
evidenced by the remittiture order of the trial court.
'\Tith the wide variance between the damages as shown
by the defendants and those shown by the plaintiff,
it is hard for this writer to justify the court's position
that $12,001.00 was justified but $16,251.00 was not
justified, under the evidence as adduced at the trial.
The Supreme Court of Utah passed upon a like
situation in the case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Willard A. Skeen, et al, supra, wherein
the facts of the case showed that there had been testimony that the value of the land ran from: plaintiff's
experts at $45,000.00, to defendants' experts at $80,000.00. The jury returned a verdict of $66,850.00. The
Supreme Court said:

13

"The jury had the benefit of opm10ns from
three qualified experts as to the value of the
land. Although these opinions vary considerablv,
it is within a prerogative of the jury to belie;'e
whom it chooses, and it chose to believe defend.
ant's expert rather than plaintiff's. On cross ex·
amination of two experts called by plaintiff, some
doubt was cast as to the thoroughness of their
inspection of the land, and this may well have
affected the jury's consideration of their lower
evaluations.
When a jury verdict is supported by compe· ·
tent evidence, as was here the case, it is generally
left unaltered by this court. In this case the
alleged passion and prejudice which could alter
this rule has not been demonstrated. Despite
plaintiff's attempt to show the jury's hostile.
attitude, it remains that the award was within•
the estimate of value given by one of the expert
witnesses, and being thus supported by compe·
tent evidence is entitled to the recognition and
affirmance of this court. The fact that the jury
chose to render its verdict in harmony with the
highest of available evaluations is not in itself
cause for reversal."
The defendants concede that the trial court has the
prerogative and authority to grant a new trial, where
there is excessive or inadequate damages, or condition·
ally order a new trial if an additure or remittiture in
not accepted by either party. Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8
U.2d 42, 327 P.2d 826; Crellin v. Thomas, 122 U. 122.
247 P.2d 264. It is to be noted, however, that where
there is adequate evidence to support the verdict ren,
dered, the court may not substitute its judgment for
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that of the jury and order a new trial conditioned upon
acceptance of the additure or remittiture. As the court
pointed out in the Bodon case:
"\Ve affirm the responsibility of this court to
be indulgent towards the verdict of the jury,
and not to disturb it so long as it is within the
bounds of reason in accordance with the principles set forth in the companion case of Schneider v. Suhrmann; and also that it is primarily
the prerogative and the duty of the trial court
to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict and
to order any necessary modification thereof.
Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the
limits of any reasonable appraisal of damages
as shown by the evidence, it should not be permitted to stand, and if the trial court fails to
rectify it we are obliged to make the correction
on appeal."

To the same effect see: Ruff v. Association for World
Travel Exchange, I P.2d 249, 351 P.2d 623. The
Supreme Court previously has pointed out that:
"We have held that mere excessiveness of the
verdict is not necessarily the standard for determining prejudice, althought it might be."

Stamp v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 5 U.2d 397, 303
P.2d 279. This case goes on to say:
"Not every verdict that appears to be excessive will warrant a new trial or a reduction in
the award, but the consideration which the court
owes to a jury cannot be permitted to blind our
eyes where the award can be accounted for only
by the presence of passion or prejudice."
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Such is not the instant case. As pointed out previoush
the award of damages was completely within the testi.
mony adduced by the experts for the plaintiff.
In the case of Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 U. 431, 18J
P.2d 123, the Supreme Court of Utah said:
"But mere excessiveness of a verdict, without
more, does not necessarily show that the verdict
was arrived at by passion or prejudice. (Citing
authority) It is true that the verdict might bt .
grossly excessive and disproportionate to the ·
injury that we could say from that fact alont
that as a matter of law the verdict must han
been arrived at by passion or prejudice. But the
facts must be such that the excess can be deter- '
mined as a matter of law, or the verdict must Lr ,
so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscieme
and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice or
corruption of part of the jury." (Citing author·
ity) (Emphasis the court's)
"The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But
the mere fact that it was more than another jury
or more than this court, might have given, or
even more than the evidence justified, does not
conclusively show that it was a result of passion
prejudice or corruption of part of the jury.
To the same effect see: Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co., 118 U. 82, 218 P.2d 1080.
It is elemental that the trial court has no discretion
to grant a new trial absent a showing of one of the
grounds specified in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Tangaro v. iJ'larrero, 13 U.2d 290, 373 P.2d
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390. In the instant case there is no showing whatsoever

ot any passion or prejudice or excessiveness of the jury's

verdict, and therefore the court abused its discretion in
granting a new trial and for that matter in ordering
a remittiture.
The Supreme Court of Utah pointed out in Paul
v. Kirkendall, 1 U.2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, that:
"It is not enough, under this rule (Rule 59
(a) ( 5) ) nor under the code provision which
is supplanted, merely to allege that the amount
itself is excessive. The amount of the verdict is
ordinarily a matter exclusively for the jury and
on the ground of adequacy of the verdict alone,
the court may not interfere with the jury's verdict
unless it clearly appears that the award was
rendered under misunderstanding or prejudice.
If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict
presents a situation that such inadequacy or
excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury of
the evidence or the instructions of the court as to
the law applicable to the case as to satisfy the
court that the verdict was rendered under such
disregard or misapprehension of the evidence
or influence of passion or prejudice, then the
court may exercise its discretion in the interests
of justice and grant a new trial. (citing authority) Therefore in reviewing the trial court's
ruling denying defendant's motion for a new
trial on the grounds of excessiveness of damages
awarded by the jury's verdict, this court is limited to a determination of whether such a ruling
was an abuse of discretion."

Plaintiff would now say that because its appraisers
appraised the property at $0.0 damage to defendants,
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that this testimony should be taken to the exclusion ,
of defendants' experts. As pointed out in the case ol
State Road Commission v. 1laggart, 19 U.2d 247, 430
P.2d 167, it is up to the determination by the jury of
the relative superiority of qualifications of the witnesses,
including the expert witnesses. In the Taggart case,
the severance damage was placed at nothing by one
state appraiser, $44,000.00 by another appraiser, as i
opposed to the defendants' experts who placed the
damages at between $178,000.00 and $315,000.00. The :
court pointed out that the finding of the jury in respect
to severance or consequential damages was within the
range of the testimony and that therefore there was •
a reasonable basis upon which the jury could find the
damages that they did find, and that therefore there '
was no abuse of discretion in not granting a new trial.
This is the same situation as is now before the court in
the present case, except that the exact opposite result
was found by the jury, that is, the jury chose to believe
the defendants' experts over the plaintiff's as was the
reversal in the Taggart case.
1

For the trial court now to substitute its judgment
for that of the jury is to usurp the jury's prerogatiw.
In the old venerable case, Jensen v. Denver & Rio

Grande Railroad Co., 44 U. 100, 138 P. 1184, 1192,
Justice Straup pointed out that:
"A court, vacating a verdict, and granting
a new trial by merely setting up his opinion or
judgment against that of the jury, but usurps
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judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional
trial by jury."
The court then pointed out that there are occasions
where the trial court may grant a new trial where there
has been "excessive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice",
however, the court points out:
"But before the court is justified to do that,
it should be clearly made to appear that the jury
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law
by which the damages were to be regulated or
wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evidence, and by so doing committed gross and
paltable error by rendering a verdict so enormous or outrageous or unjust as to be attributable to neither the charge nor the evidence, but
only to passion or prejudice."
This case, while decided in 1914, has weathered the
years and is still the law of Utah today, the concurring
opinion of Justice Crockett in Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U .2d
435, 1326 P.2d 722, notwithstanding.

POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS PRESERVED THEIR RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM
THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL.
Under Rule 72 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court only
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from a final judgment. The authorities are long and'
unwavering that an order for a new trial is not 1111
appealable order. Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17 U.21!
295, 409 P.2d 972. In the instant case, as a matter of
preserving their right to appeal and also of seeking an
intermediate appeal, the appellants followed the pro·
cedures as outlined in Flaslmn v. Paulsen, 15 U.2d 185,
389 P.2d 737, and .T. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn,
17 U.2d 120, 405 P.2d 343, and filed a petition for intermediate appeal with the Supreme Court and likewise 1
preserved the claimed error in granting a motion for
new trial.

i

The petition for interlocutory appeal was denied
on January 17, 1968, by the Supreme Court of Utah!
See File No. 11123, Supreme Court of the State of
Utah.
The defendants-appellants are now entitled to raise
before the Supreme Court the issue as to whether or
not the trial court abused its discretion in granting a
new trial to the plaintiff in this matter.
POINT IV

THE JURY, IN THE SECOND TRIAL, Bl·.
PROPERLY DELIBERATED AND THERE-.
FORE APPELLANTS WERE ENTITLED TO
A NEW TRIAL.
At the conclusion of the second trial, the jur:
returned from its deliberations and returned a yerdicl
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of $3,000.00 in favor of respondent and against appellants. Upon request of the respondent's counsel, the
jury was polled and two jurors indicated that this was
not their verdict. One juror, a Mr. Gates, stating: "I
hadn't reached a decision yet". The other juror, a Mr.
Stander, replied that it was not his verdict.
Appellants recognize that under Article 1, Section
10, of the Constitution of Utah, in civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict, however, it is
submitted that the jurors must deliberate to reach that
verdict. The instructions to the jury clearly pointed
this out in instructoin 23, which was the standard jury
instruction Section 1.7, Jury Instruction Forms, Utah,
and jury instruction 24, which was the standard jury
instruction Section 1.8. It is required that the jurors
consult with one another and deliberate with the view
of reaching an agreement. It is submitted that where
the jurors do not take enough time for all of the jurors
to reach a decision, be it against or for a verdict, there
has been improper deliberations as in effect what the
jurors are doing is each individual juror decides the
matter himself. In the case of Glover v. Berger, (Wyo.,
1953) 263 P.2d 498, the Wyoming court affirmed the
trial court's rejection of an instruction which stated
that the individual jurors should decide the matter
themselves. The court said:
"It intimated in effect that each juryman
should disregard the views of his fellows, no
matter how reasonable or cojunt these were.
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Seldom would a jury return a unanimous ver.
diet of the views if a single juryman were to
control the verdict as the instruction No. 24
aforesaid intimated should be done."
It is submitted that so long as one of the jurymen has
not reached a decision one way or the other, the jury
still has not deliberated as is required by the jury in·
structions and the law of the State of Utah. Therefore
the trial court erred in entering a judgment on the
verdict of the jury, and should have entered an order
for new trial for appellants.

Respectfully submitted,
Paul N. Cotro-Manes of
COTRO-MANES, FANKHAUSER
&BEASLEY
and
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
430 ·Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll

Attorneys for Appellants
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